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November 14, 1975

STATEMENT OF SUZANNE SHEPPARD
IN OPPOSITION TO
R.R. 7216
(A BILL TO AMEND AND EXTEND THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION
ON THE ARTS AND HUMANITIES ACT OF 1965)

Subcommittee on Select Education
of the
House Committee on Education and Labor

Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for inviting me to testify on H.R. 7216.

I

oppose the very principle of government art subsidies. ~y
testimony will consist of two statements of my reasons for
opposing these subsidies; the first is from my remarks at a
hearing of the California State Legislature's Joint Committee
on the Arts; the second is the argument I delivered at the trial
of my suit against the California Arts Commission. These two
statements will show that it is precisely because I am an artist
that I oppose government subsidies for the arts.

I.

TESTIMONY BEFORE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE'S
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ARTS
September 24, 1974

I'm an artist, and I am here to speak in opposition to
state support of the arts.
Every individual has a right to think for himself - to
express his own mind, to make his own choices and to act according
to his own judgment. No one has a right to violate this right.
I urge you to consider the injustice of state subsidies for
the arts. Subsidies, as you know, require tax money. Taxation
for the arts means: involuntary patronage of the arts. Every
man has a right to choose for himself whether or not he wishes
to support any form of art or any particular work of art. The
state has no right to make these decisions for him. The state has
no right to violate his freedom of choice.

And I have no grounds to demand that the state tax anyone
for my support. No one forced me to become an artist; no one
should be forced to pay my way. If people don't like my work,
or cannot afford it, they have a right not to buy it. But
taxation for the arts vi.elates this right. A state has no right
to make artistic choices for the individual; and no artist has
reason to claim that his artistic freedom requires the denial
of another man's freedom of choice.
As legislators, you know that the state must account to the
taxpayers for the way it spends their money. In order to justify
its subsidies for the arts, the state must have reasons for the
selections it makes. This means that the state is obliged to
establish standards of artistic merit, and it cannot justifiably
support an artist who does not satisfy its standards. When
evaluating the merit of a work of art, the state has to consider
the work's content. Its content ex.presses a theme or viewpoint.
This means that the state grants official endorsement to the ideas
expressed or implied in the art it subsidizes.
This is crucial to bear in mind: A government with power
enough to endorse ideas has power enough to silence them - and
that is the essence of censorship.
State support of the arts, then, is unjust - and it achieves
the exact opposite of its alleged purpose: Instead of supporting
the arts, it undermines the very foundation on which the arts
depend: Freedom.
When a man is forced to pay taxes for the arts, he is denied
his right to act according to the judgment of his own mind. State
support of the arts costs a man his liberty of conscience.
This is an unspeakable price for anyone to pay.
II.

ARGUMENT BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT
IN

SUZANNE LEFRANC SHEPPARD v. CALIFORNIA ARTS COMMISSION
May 20, 1975
San Francisco, California
(Please note: As the plaintiff in this case, I challenged the
constitutionality of government art subsidies. For the record,

the Court ruled, on August 27, 1975, that these subsidies are
in the public interest.)
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ARGUMENT

Introduction

May it please the Court.

The question I have brought before the

Court is whether or not state support of art is within
constitutional limits. I intend to show that by the very nature

of art, its support by government will necessarily and unavoidably
conflict with First Amendment guarantees.
My argument is in three parts:

First, I will demonstrate that

when the state supports an artist's work, it thereby endorses
his personal philosophy. In order to substantiate this point,
I will show why an artist's personal philosophy is an integral
and inseparable part of his work. Second, I will explain how

the state's support of another artist impairs my own livelihood
as an independent artist. Finally, I will support my contention
that the terms of the "establishment" clause of the First
Amendment apply to the arts and prohibit their support by

government.
I.

When the state supports an artist's work,
it thereby endorses his personal philosophy.
I shall begin by observing a· self-evident fact: Every man is
limited in the amount of work he can·a.ccOmplish in.his lifetim~. Thus,
no artist can ever compose every possible combination of musical
notes, nor paint everything there is to paint,· nor choreograph
every conceivable expressive movement. If he is to create
anything at all, he must limit the possibilities for each artistic
work to a manageable number. The progress of his work is marked,

therefore, by an on-going concern for what to include and what
to omit.
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Y.y point is this:

To make the choices which satisfy his
expressive intent, an artist has only one immediate source of
guidance: His judgment of what is important; that is, his
personal code' of values. Thus, with every decision he makes
as to what to include and what to omit, an artist's work
reflects his values and thereby expresses his view of what
gives life meaning. In so doing, of course, an artist's work
entails philosophical implications.
It is no accident, therefore, that aesthetics is classified as
a branch of philosophy. This classification simply reflects
the fact that art belongs to the realm of me~'s struggle to
find and express the meaning of human existence. But an artist's
creation is not a philosophical treatise; it is not designed to
evoke the cold blade of analytical reason. It is an impassioned
statement whose persuasive power is addressed to men's emotions.
Through his work, the artist says - in effect: "This is what
life means to me. This is what is important." And whether
he says this explicitly or implicitly, the artist expresses
his personal convictions, not with the neutrality o.f a reporter,
but with the assertiveness of an advocate.
So it is that an artist's personal philosophy becomes the very
soul of his work - the core of its meaning. And !!.Q. it is that
when the state supports _fill artist, it thereby and ~avoidably
endorses the artist's philosophy.
In !!.2_ doing, the state commlts !!'.!.ill of ideological favoritism totally at odds with the spirit of this country.
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ThP state's support of anothPr arti~t impai~s
my own liv~lihoo1 as an independent arttst.
My

gove~nment's
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philosophy relegates my standing as a ~itizen to se~o~d-class
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ns a~ artist, I hqve Jit~~ally staked my rar~er nn my own
philosophical convictio~s - for this reason: WhPn I offer my
work for sale, it is my view of life which gives my work its

meaning; and what my work means to a potential buyer will
determine the degree of his interest in it. Thus, my personal
philosophy constitutes the ultimate se~l;tng.:.E.£tD.1 of my work.
Since my ph.i 1 osophy is the .~.£!!!..££ of my 1.i ve 1 ihood ~ any use
of state power which effectively impugns my philosophy will
thereby undermine my 1ivelihood. Tf the state oper.l.Y and
'ti "tl opposes
.
.i'
i>h
exp~:h,I
my v-1. ew <Lf' J. Le•
.; en 1.•,: f orec..1., oses my oppor t.;\PH·+·
..Jes
as a~ artist; l:f the state ).m.J?1.ic.i_!1..L disapproves of my V"1ew - whlch
is the nase when it endorses another artist's work - then it
threatens f.£!:!_cl_p~ of my opportunities. To one whose
livelihood depends on freedom of expression, the mere threat of
its removal is damage enough~ But I am not subject under Chapter
1143 to threat alone. As I said in my complaint, at page 2 - quote:
"Sa:id statute enables defendant to grant to selected artists

the funds, influence and authority of the.State, thereby
g.iving said artists an imrnedi.ate competitive advantage
over plaintiff ••• In effect, said statute allows defendant
to estab1ish a privileged class of artists, and compels
plaintiff to bear - now and in the future - part of the
costs of maintaining their competitive advantages over
her." - Close quote.
To that statement, I would add only the following:

Where art is

subsidized, it is not just artists who get the funds,

influenre

and authority of the state. Above all. it is their personal
philosophies which are so preferentially endowed.
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III.
The terms of the "establishment" clause apply
to the arts and prohibit their support by government.
In defense of my rights, I wish now to offer points and authorities
to substantiate the following point: that the "establishment"
clause prohibits the government's support of the arts for the
same reason and purpose that it prohibits government's support
of religion. I shall demonstrate that governmental support of
any personal creed, and not just of any religious creed, is
constitutionally prohibited - and therefore, no artist's work,
advancing as it does his particular philosophy, may be supported - and
thereby endorsed - by government.
There is substantial authority to support the conclusion that
the term "religion" in the "establishment" clause embraces
all personal views on the meaning of life - and not just religious
versions of these views.
First, I offer the following opinion from Flaska v. State
(177 P2d 174, cited at page 237 by 16 Am Jur 2d) - quote:
"The language of a constitution is not to be limited to
the precise things considered therein, but it should
embrace other things of the same general nature
or class ••• " - Close quote.
If this principle of construction be observed, then the scope
of the "establishment" clause logically extends beyond religion
to embrace the arts, which express personal views on the very
same issue dealt with by religion: The meaning of life.
Further support for construing the "establishment'' clause to
embrace all personal phi.losophy may be found in the case of
Milwaukee Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses v. Mullen (cited in
!§_Am Jur 2d at page 235). In its opinion, the court said - quote:
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"The meaning of constitutlonal guaranties never varies:
it is the scope of their application which must expand
or contract ••• some degree of elasticity thereby being
ordered. not to the meaning. but to the application of
constitutional principles." - Close quote.
The application of the "establishment" clause is obviously
directed toward governmental neutrality where the advancement.
of personal belief is concerned. But clearly, the state's
endorsement of an artist's philosophy is not an act of
ideological neutrality.
One may still ask, however: If the "establishment" clause
embraces the arts, then why doesn't it mention them?
Mr. Justice Jackson addressed himself directly to the intent
behind the wording of the First Amendment; in his opinion in
Douglas v. Jeanne.tte ( 63 S Ct at 888) he said - quote:
"It may be asked why then does the First Amendment
separately mention free exercise of religion? ••• It
was to assure religious teaching as much freedom as
secular discussion, rather than to assure it greater
license, that led to its separate statement ••. " - Close quote.
From Mr. Justice Jackson's observations on the "free exercise"
clause, one may draw the following inference: The "establishment 0
clause gives religion separate mention, not as a gesture of
governmental hostility toward religion, but as a guarantee to
all citizens of any persuasion that our government .!fil. ~
no Qosition whatsoever .2!! matters touching individual conscience.
If this is the meaning of the "establishment" clause - and in
logic and justice there can be no other - then .!h.! a.rts, which
promulgate fil personal .Ehilosophies !l1. the-ir creators, .!!..~
consti tutionallv deni.ed K.Qvernmental support.

7

Conclusion

At the beginning of my argument regarding the scope of the
"establishment" clause, I contended that our government is
prohibited from supporting the arts for the same reason and
the same purpose that it is prohibited from supporting religion.
My argument would not be complete if I neglected to stress
that reason and purpose. I shall bring the whole point of
my argument into sharp relief by offering three brief excerpts two from 36 ALR 3d 1256, and one from my complaint.
In 36 ALR 3d 1256, at page 1260, the following comment is made
about the "establishment" clause as it applies to religion - quote:
"It has been suggested that the underlying rationale of
the rule has been to prevent the use of public property
in such a manner as to connote governmental sponsorship
of religious beliefs, with the attending result that
persons who do not share thes~ beliefs might feel that
their own convictions were stigmati.zed or officially
deemed less worthy than those awarded the appearance of
official government endorsement." - Close quote.
In my complaint, at page 4, I said - quote:
"Said statute thereby grants to defendant the power
to determine which ideas, as well as which artists,
will or will not merit and receive the promotion,
support - and therefore, the endorsement - of the State.
In effect, said statute is the secular equivalent of the
State's adoption of an official creed, to which plaintiff
does not subscribe, but for which she is ·compelled to
pay support." - Close quote.
At page 1273 of 36 ALR 3d 1256. the following comment is made
J.d..
about the case of Lowe v. Eugene__(]6 .~LW'1?.49) - quote:
!'J

the court concluded, the government has no business
placing its power, prestige, or property_at the disposal
of private persons or groups either to aid or oppose
any religion, and the majority, no matter how pure
its intentions, has no right under our system of
government to exert its political muscle to gain a
preferred place for its testimony to its religious
beliefs." - Close quote.
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It is evident that recent Court decisions have recognized how
demeaning it is for government ~o require a citizen's involuntary
support for the advancement of someone else's beliefs. Even
greater, then, is the injustice, when such use of governmental
power can impair that citizen's livelihood.
Your Honor. According to 36 ALR 3d 1256, at page 1260, the
Court's test of the "establishment" clause is whether or not
there exists any governmental purpose to advance or inhibit
religion. It is my contention - and the point of my argument that the test of ill "establishment" clause logically and justly
embraces the guestion whether ~ not there exists any governmental
purpose to advance or inhibi.t the arts.
Thank you, Your Honor.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee:
Undoubtedly, you have been told by many witnesses that the
arts will perish without government subsidies. If it be the
survival of the arts (and artists) that you are truly concerned
with, then leave them alone.
So long as men are free - free to choose and express their
own personal values - the arts will live. Involuntary patronage
of the arts is an insidious enslavement of the individual to
his government. If you approve the measure now under consideration,
by endorsing an extension of the National Foundation for the Arts,
you will effectively reject the principle of individualism which
has distinguished this country from dictatorships everywhere.

